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With almost 600 coal plants shut down since 2010, we are racing towards a grid reliability crisis of our own making. Millions of Americans are at risk of electricity price spikes from a loss of energy diversity.

Cheap natural gas, in conjunction with a regulatory onslaught on the coal industry, has reduced coal’s share of our electricity mix to 30 percent — down from 50 percent little more than a decade ago. The loss of coal plants, long the foundation of our electricity system, is coming at a high cost. It has already resulted in the loss oftens of thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for state and local governments. Our growing reliance on natural gas is beginning to stress the grid even further.

Make no mistake, low-cost natural gas has been a blessing for the nation. It has helped reduce utility bills, create jobs in gas-producing states, and improve the competitiveness of our manufacturing sector. But natural gas demand continues to grow while efforts to block new gas production and new natural gas pipelinesgrow in tandem. Environmental activists waving a keep-it-in-the-ground bannerhave succeeded in influencing mainstream politics with disastrous consequences for energy policy. Massachusetts is case in point.

The Bay Statehas shuttered its coal fleet, resulting in a disproportionate reliance on natural gas to meet both its electricity and heating needs. On bitterly cold winter days mayhem has ensued. While the U.S. is now the world’s largest natural gas producer. Massachusetts, particularly the Boston area, has at times been home to the most expensive natural gas in the world this winter.

Gas demand has far exceeded the capacity of the region’s pipeline network to get it where it’s needed. Pipeline companies have tried building new capacity to meet the demand of the regions’ utilities. But environmental activists and their allies in the state legislature have blocked it.

Pipelines are now being challenged by activists in nearly every state they’re proposed. The Keystone XL obstruction model has become a playbook for extremists who clearly don’t care about grid reliability or consumer costs. Just ask Boston ratepayers.

But for those of us that do care, the current trends are deeply concerning. We should certainly fight to expand our gas infrastructure and take steps to push back against activist obstruction. But we would also be wise to preserve our existing coal fleet.

Congress can do its part by approving a measure that would provide a 30 percent tax credit for operating a coal plant for up to five years. Such a bill, sponsored by Rep. Larry Buschon (R-IN), is pending in the House. Providing a tax credit for coal plants will help make the electric grid more reliable and hold down the cost of electricity production by preserving energy diversity. This, in turn, will result in lower energy costs and a more competitive position for U.S. manufactured goods in world markets.

Although the short-term picture for coal is challenging, the long-term picture is cause for optimism. The U.S. has the world’s largest coal reserves — and our coal fleet is cleaner than ever. Coal should not be seen asa problem to be fixed but rather part of the solution to our nation’s current energy challenges.

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We had an experience of a power outage that lasted 2 days. It was miserable.

“Grid emergency” is not a household term. At least, not yet. A grid emergency is an event that threatens to shut down all electric power in a specific area, which could be a few states or the entire country.

A grid emergency could come from a cyberattack from an enemy state, terrorists, or just hackers. It could also come naturally from our neighbor in the galaxy: the sun. An electromagnetic storm on the sun — called a Carrington Event — could shut down all electrical systems on Earth.

On Dec. 17, 2017, no enemy — just a fire in an electrical switch room — caused a blackout at the Atlanta Airport stranding thousands of passengers in the dark terminal and disrupting thousands of flights all over the country. The power outage lasted 12 hours. That nightmare was just a micro-example of what could happen in a grid emergency.

The Federal Power Act (FPA) gives the president the authority to declare a grid emergency and to delegate the authority to deal with it to the secretary of Energy. In 2015, Congress passed a law with a delightful acronym: the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, or the FAST Act. This law authorizes the Energy Department to issue rules governing the secretary’s actions in a cyberattack.


After deliberating for about three years, the U.S. Department of Energy issued a final rule two weeks ago defining the powers of the secretary if the president declares a grid emergency.

Let us say that an enemy state realizes that they could never physically invade the United States, but that they could bring the country to its knees by detonating nuclear weapons overhead at high altitude creating electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) that would cripple our power grid. (Best selling author, Brad Thor writes about this scenario in his 2014 novel Act of War. Over 30 years ago, another novel, Warday, also dealt with high altitude detonation of nuclear weapons knocking out our power.)

And so we learn of this threat. The secretary of Energy gets a grid emergency declaration from the president. As the threat gets closer, the secretary orders all electrical generating and distribution systems — all power systems — to shut down to avoid being fried by the EMP.

When this happens our power goes out. What happens to those running businesses from their computers? What about those on life support devices like dialysis machines or medical monitors that suddenly quit or go dark?

Next the secretary advises all electrical systems that deliver critical human services — such as drinking water — to go to back-up power, such as generators, that would not be so vulnerable.

There are over 52,000 community water systems in the United States. Many are very small. More than 31,000 systems have fewer than 10,000 customers. How many of these small systems do you think have back-up power?

The common denominator with all of these consequences of grid emergency scenarios is to realize what could happen and to take preventative action today, long before the trouble starts.

With the dialysis machine or health monitors it’s a battery or a home generator. With a business, there’s a real problem. A battery or generator will get the computer back on, but if the Internet is gone, what good will it do?

What about fuel for a generator? If someone doesn’t have it, they have to get it. Drive to a gas station? An EMP will fry the electrical system in their car. No driving; they’ll have to walk.

Finally, when people get thirsty from all of this anxiety and hassle, they go get a drink of water. They turn on the tap. Nothing happens. The board of directors of the water system in their small town didn’t want to raise rates to pay for a back-up generator.

What’s the secretary of Energy going to do about the dialysis machine or the health monitor, internet businesses, and drinking water? Some of these problems — like the dialysis machine — are easy. Others like the businesses can be very difficult. The drinking water problem is a question of money.

So what advice should we give ourselves today, before there is any threat of a grid emergency?

“Let’s not wait until the cyberattack happens!”

Michael Curley is a lawyer and visiting scholar at the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, D.C. He teaches and has written four books about environmental and energy law and finance. He has published over 40 articles. He served on the Environmental Financial Advisory Board at EPA for 21 years under four presidents. He is also on the Advisory Board of the 501(c)(4) corporation “Protect Our Power”.

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Never before had we seen a bull market driven by what we refer to as growth counter-cyclical stocks. Bull markets like the 1990s or early 2000s tend to be driven by cyclical stocks. Technology drove the 1990s bull market of course, while financials drove the early 2000s bull market. We call these two sectors “hyper-cyclicals” for this very reason.

We find ourselves in a similar situation today—holding an out-of-consensus viewpoint on a certain segment of the equity market. Specifically, we continue to have a bullish disposition toward the resources sector broadly, and the energy sector in particular. We wish to review our bullish thesis on the energy sector in greater detail.

There are roughly 3,200 companies in the top 85% of the market cap of all 46 developed and emerging market economies. We have created a set of market-cap weighted indexes around this global selection universe that we call the Knowledge Leaders Selection Universe (KLSU) Indexes. These indexes, which are similar to the MSCI Global Indexes, are our starting point for selecting equities for our active portfolios. We’ll be referring to these indexes for the duration of this letter. In particular, we’ll be referring to our developed market KLSU energy indexes, including:

  1. KLSU DM Americas Energy Index, which includes the top 85% of all energy companies in the US and Canada. This index contains 60 companies and has a market cap of $1.64 trillion.
  2. KLSU DM EMEA Energy Index, which includes the top 85% of all energy companies in Europe. There are 26 companies with a market cap of $736 billion.
  3. KLSU DM Asia Energy Index which includes the top 85% of all energy companies in Asia. There are 14 companies with a market cap of $95 billion.

The ideal attributes we look for in a stock are:

  1. It is within a group that has been down for at least 7-9 years. This generally indicates a group where valuations have compressed, sentiment is low and stocks can be accumulated at attractive prices.
  2. Companies have slashed capital expenditures. Generally, when capital expenditures industry-wide decline, the result is improved pricing. This is particularly relevant for an extraction industry like energy. We will get into more details on this shortly.
  3. Companies have a cheap multiple to assets and/or sales. When companies experience secular downturns, flow-based measures like earnings or cash flow can be difficult valuation inputs. We prefer asset-based measures.
  4. Companies are out of fashion among investors. Technicals can be helpful here to quantify the extent to which investors are shunning a certain group. Very often, and we’ll argue now is one of those times, investors engage in capitulation, which can give investors a great chance to buy that cheap company at even cheaper prices.
  5. An opportunity for diversification. Stocks in sectors that have experienced a low correlation to the benchmark have tremendous diversification potential.


The Very High Risk Of Low Volatility

Eight years into an economic recovery, with the S&P 500 having gone from 666 to 2,430, these are very difficult criteria to find in potential investments. Broadly, there is only one sector in the world that fits our criteria, and that is the resources sector. For now, I’ll focus on the energy sector, but most of my comments are applicable to the basic materials sector, particularly metals, both industrial and precious.

With an index base value=100, starting 10 years ago, our KLSU DM America’s Energy Index is down a cumulative 20.25%. From its high of 128.5 on May 20, 2008, the index is down 38% from peak to present. Lows in this index were made in March 2009, with the rest of the market, at 55.5, down 57% from the May 2008 peak. In January 2016, the index hit 64, not taking out the lows from 2009. The current index value of 79.75 is up 25% from the lows last January, but as mentioned earlier, is still net down 38% from 2008 highs.

European energy stocks have fared even worse. With a similar 10 year look back, and index value=100 at the start, European energy stocks are down 41.27%. They peaked in May 2008 at 124, and then fell to an ultimate low of 50.75 in March 2009. That was a 48% drop over 10 months. In contrast to North American energy stocks, the European energy sector did take out 2009 lows in January 2016. On January 20, 2016, the index bottomed at 47.5. The peak-to-trough decline for European energy stocks was 62%. European energy shares have rebounded back to a current index level of 58.75, or some 24% higher.

Asian energy stocks, using the same index methodology as the previous two examples, are down 44.8% over the last 10 years. After peaking at 133.3 in May 2008, Asian energy shares fell to a low in October 2008 at 52.15. The decline was 61% peak-to-trough. Similar to European energy stocks, Asian energy shares did take out the 2008 lows in January 2106. Asian energy stocks ultimately fell to an index level of 42.1 and have since rebounded to an index level of 55.2. From the highs in 2008, Asian energy stocks are down a cumulative 59%.

In relative performance terms, the underperformance of the global energy sector has been even more extreme. From peak values in May 2008, regional energy sectors are down:

  1. North America down 52% relative to MSCI World Index.
  2. Europe down 53% relative to the MSCI World Index.
  3. Asia down 67% relative to the MSCI World Index.

Capital Spending

Next, let’s look at the change in capital spending. Global energy sector capital spending peaked around $500 billion in 2014. Since then, spending has fallen almost $200 billion.

This 35% cut to capex is much larger than anything experienced in the 2008 recession, where capex cuts were less than $100 billion. Capital spending actually increased during the 2001 recession. Capex levels globally are back at 2008 levels, around $325 billion.

In particular, the North American energy sector cut its capex by over $100 billion since the early 2015 peak. North America represents roughly two-thirds of total global energy capital expenditure and over half of the $200 billion cut to capex.

Of the $200 billion drop in energy capex, Europe accounted for about a quarter, or about $60 billion. Capex peaked for European energy companies in 2014 at about $170 billion. Here again, these cuts are 3x larger than what we experienced in the 2008 recession. European energy companies also increased capex during the 2001 recession.

Developed Asia is by far the smallest portion of the energy market, but still capex came down roughly 40%, or $8 billion. It peaked around $20 billion in 2014 and is currently a little more than $12 billion. Asian energy producers did not cut back on capex in the 2008 recession or the 2000 recession.

For energy producers, inventory levels are highly related to capital spending and demand. The commercial inventories in the US represent the lowest-cost storage in the world. The five largest US crude oil storage facilities (and capacity) in the US are: 1) Cushing (82 million barrels), 2) Louisiana Offshore Port (62 million barrels), 3) Houston (36 million barrels), 4) Beaumont-Nederland (30 million barrels), and 5) St. James Louisiana (30 million barrels). These five storage facilities represent roughly half of all US commercial storage. Storing oil on contracted VLCCs (very large crude carriers) would be the most expensive way to store oil.

With respect to inventories, there are some interesting relationships I would highlight. Commercial inventory levels hovered around 350 million barrels from 2011 to 2014. Then in the spring of 2015, they leapt to 450 million barrels before backing down to 425 million in the fall. But, before year-end, 2015 inventories were building again and pushed to 500 million barrels in early 2016. Inventories then fell back to around 475 million barrels by the fall of 2016, but then they surged again to a peak of 530 million barrels by March of 2017.  Since then inventories have backed down about 20 million barrels to about 513 million.

In general, what we saw over this period of inventory building was that when inventories built, the broad US stock market outperformed the MSCI World Index, and when inventories fell, they underperformed. The surge in the NASDAQ in the last few years is the best illustration of this. The global energy sector behaved in the exact opposite manner. When inventories built, global energy stocks underperformed the MSCI World Index, and when they fell the energy sector outperformed. Focusing on US commercial inventories is a great barometer of the global inventory situation since US commercial storage is the cheapest in the world. If there are draws on US inventories, then there are clearly bigger draws on higher cost storage.

The International Energy Agency came out on June 6, 2017 affirming demand projections for 2017 and 2018. Specifically, they see demand increasing by 1.54 million barrels/day in 2017 and 1.62 million barrels/day in 2018. These estimates represent growth rates of roughly 1.7-1.8% for this year and next. This would represent among the higher growth rates that the world has experienced over the last decades.


In cyclical industries like resources, valuations can be tricky. Flows fluctuate wildly. In depressed cyclical industries, we prefer to focus on asset-based valuation metrics like price-to-book value. US energy stocks sell at a premium to the rest of the world, but in all regions, valuations hover near 15 year lows. Over the last 20 years, the highest multiple achieved for North American energy producers was 3.5x our intangible-adjusted book value, where we credit companies with their innovative investments. The low was 1.3x in January of 2016 and is now at 1.7x. Values only dipped below 1.5x book value for one quarter in 2009 and two quarters in 2016.

Using our intangible-adjusted price-to-book value metrics, European energy stocks are selling at a 5% discount to book value. Multiples peaked at 2.7x in 2005 and have been sliding since. Trough valuations in January 2016 were .7x book value.

Asian energy shares are the cheapest in the developed world, currently selling for .8x intangible-adjusted book value. Multiples peaked in 2006 at 2.7x book value and troughed in January 2016 at .65x book value.

As a cross check, we’ll also look at the median stock (the visual middle) in the group. The message is the same, with median valuations hovering near 15 year lows. Median valuations in all regions are in the bottom quartile of the last 15 years.


There are lots of ways to illustrate how out of favor energy stocks are right now. I’ll focus just on the North American energy sector because the statistics are most acute. Only 11% of US energy stocks are above the 200-day moving average. 30% marks oversold in our work. These oversold levels are matched by similar readings in 2009 and 2016.

Over the last 65 days, as energy has slumped, 38% of stocks are making new 65-day lows. Readings in 2008 spiked to almost 100%, and in 2016 they hit 80%, but remember we are 9 years into the liquidation and should expect more modest readings. Nevertheless, 40% marks an oversold reading in our work, so we are about there.

Only 8% of North American energy stocks outperformed the developed world over the last 65 days. This is close to the worst reading we have ever seen. In March, we hit a low of only 2%, which was the most extreme stat we have ever seen for North American energy shares. At the depths of the 2008 sell-off, we only hit a reading of 5%. Capitulation is clear here.

The performance of stocks is a function of: 1) the percent of days that the stock is up, 2) the amount it is up/down each day. Focusing on the first variable, the percent of days that stocks are up or down is highly mean reverting to 50/50. This mean-reverting randomness (like flipping a coin) is the essence of work like Burton Malkiel’s, “A Random Walk Down Wall Street.”  In the real world, stocks go on runs and slumps, periods where the percent of days up are more than 50% or less than 50%. A group experiencing a string of sub-50% readings suggests it’s in a slump. In other words, it represents a group in liquidation. For the better part of the last decade, the percent of up days for the energy sector averaged around 45%. This is illustrative of how long energy stocks have been in a slump. Currently only 40% of the last 88 trading days have been positive days for the North American energy stocks. The lowest readings were registered in 2008 and 2016, when only 35% of trailing 88 trading days were positive.


There are three basic ways to manage the risk of an equity portfolio:

  1. Diversify, by owning a collection of stocks from different industries
  2. Hedge, by shorting stocks or equity futures
  3. Buy insurance, like buying an out-of-the-money put option.

The essence of diversification is choosing assets that are not perfectly correlated with each other. The logic is simple enough: when one asset zigs, another zags. Years ago, finance scholars proved that a portfolio of securities is less risky than an individual holding, and the idea of diversification as a risk management tool was born.

When I survey the landscape of US equities, it appears that there are very few opportunities for diversification. My method is simple: I look at the correlation over the last 10 years of each North American sector in our global Knowledge Leaders Selection Universe (KLSU) Indexes to the S&P 500 Index.

Starting with the consumer sectors, it is amazing to see a 98% correlation. Now the consumer discretionary sector outperformed the broader North American equity market, but I am not so concerned with relative performance in this exercise. Rather, I am interested in identifying sectors that can add diversification to a portfolio. Clearly there is little portfolio diversification owning discretionary shares.

Same story when I look at the consumer staples sector. It has a 97% correlation with the S&P 500 over the last decade. Next is the financial sector, where again we see very high correlations. The North American financial sector has a 92% correlation with the S&P 500. On to health care next. Again, I see little diversification benefit to a sector that is 97% correlated with the S&P 500. The industrial sector takes the cake for the sector with the highest correlation to the S&P 500. It has an amazing 99% correlation over the last decade. No diversification here. Closely behind the industrial sector is the technology sector, with a trailing 10 year correlation of 98%. Even the staid telecom sector has an 85% correlation with the S&P 500 over the last decade.

To highlight the concentration of returns and difficulty finding good diversification opportunities:

  1. 8 out of 10 sectors in North America have a correlation to the S&P 500 over 80%.
  2. 7 out of 10 sectors in North America have a correlation to the S&P 500 over 90%.
  3. 5 out of 10 sectors in North America have a correlation to the S&P 500 over 97%.

For those still pursuing active asset allocation, there are two sectors in North America that should come into focus. The energy sector has the lowest correlation to the S&P 500 of any sector. Over the last decade, the sector only has a 32% correlation with the S&P 500. This means the S&P only explained about 9% of the movements of energy stocks (the r-squared). With correlations this low, energy shares appear to be an effective diversifier.

The sector with the next lowest correlation is the basic materials sector. Here the correlation over the last decade is somewhat higher than energy at 50%, which means the S&P 500 explained about 25% of the returns in the materials sector (r-squared). But still, the sector is really driven by idiosyncratic features like the price of copper or polyethylene.

The take-away for all those for that practice diversification as a risk management tool is that the resources sectors are really the only sources of diversification in the US equity market right now. While a portfolio with a good allocation to resources is likely underperforming the benchmark this year, if/when the US equity market experiences another bout of “risk off,” like it did last Friday, these areas should bolster portfolio performance.


When I put this all together, I see a group:

  1. That has massively underperformed over the last decade,
  2. That has slashed capex to decade lows,
  3. That is in the lowest quartile based on price-to-intangible-adjusted book value,
  4. Appears to be experiencing capitulation, punctuating how out of fashion the group is,
  5. That has a low correlation and thus offers effective diversification.

As I said earlier, the resource sector broadly (energy and materials) are the only groups that meet all the criteria we like to identify. Why this combination of variables? It is generally a set up for a multi-year period of outperformance.

Suffice it say the rest of the equity markets appear as the polar opposite of this set-up. Most other segments of the market have outperformed, capex is near all-time highs, valuations are extended and sentiment is euphoric. I think all the references to FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) crystallize this. Similar to the early 1970s, where companies that were secular growth stories perceived to deliver consistent earnings (Avon, Polaroid, etc.), the Nifty-Fifty as they were called, promptly fell 50-80% in the 1973-1974 bear market.

From May 2015 to February 2016, the oil stocks were liquidated much worse than the oil price itself. This type of behavior marked the low in energy stocks in December 1987, February 1992 and March 2009. Assets in Rydex energy funds are down to only $26 million, unchanged from the February 2016 low, having fallen from $114 million at the peak in July 2014. Some energy stocks have recently taken out February 2016 lows, but I don’t think they go deeper. We expect a slow multi-year rebound in energy stocks.

We’ve definitely been early on our energy call, but I think the stars are aligning for the energy sector to outperform in the near future.



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A NEW commodity spawns a lucrative, fast-growing industry, prompting antitrust regulators to step in to restrain those who control its flow. A century ago, the resource in question was oil. Now similar concerns are being raised by the giants that deal in data, the oil of the digital era. These titans—Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft—look unstoppable. They are the five most valuable listed firms in the world. Their profits are surging: they collectively racked up over $25bn in net profit in the first quarter of 2017. Amazon captures half of all dollars spent online in America. Google and Facebook accounted for almost all the revenue growth in digital advertising in America last year.

Such dominance has prompted calls for the tech giants to be broken up, as Standard Oil was in the early 20th century. This newspaper has argued against such drastic action in the past. Size alone is not a crime. The giants’ success has benefited consumers. Few want to live without Google’s search engine, Amazon’s one-day delivery or Facebook’s newsfeed. Nor do these firms raise the alarm when standard antitrust tests are applied. Far from gouging consumers, many of their services are free (users pay, in effect, by handing over yet more data). Take account of offline rivals, and their market shares look less worrying. And the emergence of upstarts like Snapchat suggests that new entrants can still make waves.

See all updates

But there is cause for concern. Internet companies’ control of data gives them enormous power. Old ways of thinking about competition, devised in the era of oil, look outdated in what has come to be called the “data economy” (see Briefing). A new approach is needed.

Quantity has a quality all its own

What has changed? Smartphones and the internet have made data abundant, ubiquitous and far more valuable. Whether you are going for a run, watching TV or even just sitting in traffic, virtually every activity creates a digital trace—more raw material for the data distilleries. As devices from watches to cars connect to the internet, the volume is increasing: some estimate that a self-driving car will generate 100 gigabytes per second. Meanwhile, artificial-intelligence (AI) techniques such as machine learning extract more value from data. Algorithms can predict when a customer is ready to buy, a jet-engine needs servicing or a person is at risk of a disease. Industrial giants such as GE and Siemens now sell themselves as data firms.

This abundance of data changes the nature of competition. Technology giants have always benefited from network effects: the more users Facebook signs up, the more attractive signing up becomes for others. With data there are extra network effects. By collecting more data, a firm has more scope to improve its products, which attracts more users, generating even more data, and so on. The more data Tesla gathers from its self-driving cars, the better it can make them at driving themselves—part of the reason the firm, which sold only 25,000 cars in the first quarter, is now worth more than GM, which sold 2.3m. Vast pools of data can thus act as protective moats.

Access to data also protects companies from rivals in another way. The case for being sanguine about competition in the tech industry rests on the potential for incumbents to be blindsided by a startup in a garage or an unexpected technological shift. But both are less likely in the data age. The giants’ surveillance systems span the entire economy: Google can see what people search for, Facebook what they share, Amazon what they buy. They own app stores and operating systems, and rent out computing power to startups. They have a “God’s eye view” of activities in their own markets and beyond. They can see when a new product or service gains traction, allowing them to copy it or simply buy the upstart before it becomes too great a threat. Many think Facebook’s $22bn purchase in 2014 of WhatsApp, a messaging app with fewer than 60 employees, falls into this category of “shoot-out acquisitions” that eliminate potential rivals. By providing barriers to entry and early-warning systems, data can stifle competition.

Who ya gonna call, trustbusters?

The nature of data makes the antitrust remedies of the past less useful. Breaking up a firm like Google into five Googlets would not stop network effects from reasserting themselves: in time, one of them would become dominant again. A radical rethink is required—and as the outlines of a new approach start to become apparent, two ideas stand out.

The first is that antitrust authorities need to move from the industrial era into the 21st century. When considering a merger, for example, they have traditionally used size to determine when to intervene. They now need to take into account the extent of firms’ data assets when assessing the impact of deals. The purchase price could also be a signal that an incumbent is buying a nascent threat. On these measures, Facebook’s willingness to pay so much for WhatsApp, which had no revenue to speak of, would have raised red flags. Trustbusters must also become more data-savvy in their analysis of market dynamics, for example by using simulations to hunt for algorithms colluding over prices or to determine how best to promote competition (see Free exchange).

The second principle is to loosen the grip that providers of online services have over data and give more control to those who supply them. More transparency would help: companies could be forced to reveal to consumers what information they hold and how much money they make from it. Governments could encourage the emergence of new services by opening up more of their own data vaults or managing crucial parts of the data economy as public infrastructure, as India does with its digital-identity system, Aadhaar. They could also mandate the sharing of certain kinds of data, with users’ consent—an approach Europe is taking in financial services by requiring banks to make customers’ data accessible to third parties.

Rebooting antitrust for the information age will not be easy. It will entail new risks: more data sharing, for instance, could threaten privacy. But if governments don’t want a data economy dominated by a few giants, they will need to act soon.

The chart tells the story. The problem clearly is that oil, once the plentiful cheap provider of energy and of course the million other uses that it has, has reached the point of where the costs are prohibitive to production, or very close too it.

The US is now sitting on a massive supply of natural gas, in addition to a mountain of coal. The generation of power needs to be switched to gas, away from oil. Less demand, lower prices. The result will allow oil to be used in other areas at a lower price. Electric cars, filled up with electricity generated by natural gas.

Productivity and the natural rate of interest need to rise if there is to be any chance of reducing through payment of the now unmanageable debt loads. If productivity does not rise, and the natural rate of interest with it, vast quantities of capital [debt] will be destroyed in default. America and the world are no longer rich enough to simply default and maintain the standard of living currently enjoyed.

The world faces a long-term uranium shortage as China and India build new nuclear plants, and major buying opportunities may emerge for shares of some beaten-down uranium producers.

Uranium prices have seen the largest drop in two years following the Japanese nuclear disaster and Germany’s decision to phase out its nuclear plants, both of which hit uranium prices hard. This has hammered the stocks of the leading uranium producers, but the longer-term fundamental and technical outlook suggests a major buying opportunity may lie ahead.

Germany depends on nuclear power for 23% of its needs, and with Japan considering cutting back on its nuclear expansion plans, the entire industry has been in retreat. Though Japan is the third-largest nuclear power producer after the US and France, it’s important to take a much more global look at the prospects for nuclear power.

Well I’ve held a uranium position for a little while, currently I’m up about 13% on the position. Buy on the cannons as they say. The above article is from Forbes, but the Economist has been running similar articles. While nuclear will probably remain feared and generally unpopular, there are many new power stations being built, particularly in China, thus the demand for uranium will rise, as will its price.

Economic growth. The panacea. For Western economies, the mature economies, carrying far too much debt, economic growth is required to lift them past the major problems brewing and soon coming to the boil.

Energy fuels productivity from capital investment. Coal fueled the industrial revolution, providing abundant, and therefore a cheap energy source to England, which in the the early 1800’s was burning in coal, the equivalent of 15M acres of wood per year. From coal, the world moved to oil. Oil has been the stalwart since the early 1900’s.

Energy, cheap energy, is what provides capital with it’s amazing productivity. With the advent of electricity, powered by power stations, fueled with coal, oil, the genie was out of the bottle. Oil of course fueled transport, which further enhanced the division of labour, and added further wealth.

Currently it’s not so much that oil is running out, although that will at some point be an issue: it is that the cost in energy, of extracting the oil is rising. The key ratio is: Energy Return/Energy Invested. In the 1930’s this was circa 100:1 in the 1970’s 30:1 currently, calculations put it somewhere around 16:1 If the world were a giant corporation, running financial statements, an analysis would disclose that the return on capital is falling. Productivity is falling. Growth is falling. This, when combined with the negative demographics and crippling liabilities incurred via the Socialist dream, has placed the world in a tricky position.

Biofuels have been an area of research. Until yesterday I held BIOF, an ethanol producer, that essentially was a bad play. Biofuels however have a potentially brighter future than this failure might indicate. Forget ethanol, the BIOF product, ethanol is a technology that is going nowhere. Rather, consider “Drop In Fuels” Drop-in-fuels are hydrocarbons grown by bacteria, fed on sugar. Drop-in-fuels can critically fuel jets. Ethanol never could be used for Jet fuel, and electric motors could never power jets: the world can’t and won’t need to give up jets.

The electric car has every possibility of actually taking off this time round. If they do, they still need the power to be supplied from electric generation powered from, drop-in-fuels. So either way, drop-in-fuels have a market, either to fuel cars running petrol/diesel motors, or running power stations to generate the electricity. Jets will be reliant on jet-fuel manufactured in this manner.

The US may, or may not, after the nuclear disaster in Japan, proceed with nuclear reactors on mainland US sites. Even if they do, there will be room enough for drop-in-fuel generators to provide electricity for business and domestic demand. The key is that energy has to become, as it was in the early 1900’s, cheap, abundant and [relatively] clean. The US also wants energy independence. The Arabs and Middle East debacles, military bases, can all be mitigated, pulling away from Imperialistic US foreign policy.

So who makes it, does it actually work, and more importantly, is there a stock that I can speculate in?

Dr Shaw is your man. Based in Redwood City California, Alan Shaw is the boss of Codexis which makes specialised enzymes that perform the chemical conversions. Who backs him? Shell and Cosan. Shell needs no introduction. Cosan is Brazil’s third largest sugar producer. Together, they are going to scale-up: building a factory that can produce 2.5M barrels.

The stock trades on the NASDAQ as ticker CDXS