banks


I’ll be making some analysis and comments on this later.

What I can say tonight is that the Bank and the Treasury are working together on a “funding for lending” scheme that would provide funding to banks for an extended period of several years, at rates below current market rates and linked to the performance of banks in sustaining or expanding their lending to the UK non-financial sector during the present period of heightened uncertainty. The Bank would lend, as in its existing facilities, against a much greater value of collateral comprising loans to the real economy to protect taxpayers. But the long term nature of the lending and its pricing mean that the Bank could conduct such an operation only with the approval of the Government, as offered by the Chancellor earlier. So such a scheme would be a joint effort between Bank and Treasury. It would complement the Government’s existing schemes, and tackle the high level of funding costs directly. It could, I hope, be in place within a few weeks.

The action was taken specifically because,

The crisis in the euro area is affecting our own economy in two ways over and above the direct effect of a dampening in the demand for our exports. The first is via bank funding costs, which have risen since the middle of 2011 as the crisis has intensified. In turn, that has led to higher borrowing rates on mortgages and loans to SMEs. This rise in bank funding costs reflects in part the exposure of our major banks to the periphery economies. Any significant re-denomination of their currencies, or a default on domestic debts, would, both directly and as a result of the consequences for all our economies, put a dent in the capital position of our banks. As a result, investors demand a higher risk premium on loans to banks, pushing up the cost of borrowing for home-owners and businesses.

The other effect of the euro-area crisis has been to create a large black cloud of uncertainty hanging over not only the euro area but our economy too, and indeed the world economy as a whole. Complete uncertainty means that the risks to prospective investments that will yield returns in five or ten years’ time are simply impossible to quantify. The black cloud has dampened animal spirits so that businesses and households are battening down the hatches to prepare for the storms ahead. The result is that lower spending leads to lower incomes and a self-reinforcing weaker picture for growth.

May 19 (Bloomberg) — Morgan Stanley, the lead underwriter in Facebook Inc.’s initial public offering, stands to take a hit from a stock market debut that stoked disappointment among investors in the largest social network.

The bank stepped in to prop up the stock from dipping below its $38 IPO price yesterday, said people with knowledge of the matter, who asked not to be identified because the purchases were private. Morgan Stanley, based in New York, was the only underwriter among Facebook’s 33 banks with the responsibility to support the shares, the people said

As a result, Morgan Stanley may have spent billions of dollars to support the stock price by buying shares in the market. Some market participants said that the underwriters had to absorb mountains of stock to defend the $38 level and keep the market from dipping below it.

The firm did this by tapping into a 63 million share over-allotment option, or greenshoe, according to sources familiar with the deal.
As an indication of the cost, had Morgan Stanley bought all of the shares traded around $38 in the final 20 minutes of the day, it would have spent nearly $2 billion. Underwriters are not obligated to prop up a stock on debut, but typically do.

That being said, why the need for deposit insurance? The risk is all gone right?

Errr, no, not even close. As long as you allow the banks to engage in, nay, encourage the banks to engage in fractional reserve lending, the banking system carries risk, that is carried by the depositor. The demand deposit is a contract for fungible goods, that does not transfer ownership to the bank. Hence the requirement of deposit insurance. Simply remove fractional reserve lending and create 100% reserve lending.

Normally I wouldn’t disagree with this chap. His posts are full of good sense. On this one however he has gone off the rails.

But the book is weak, because it does not recognize that the standard for money and the regulation of banks are separate issues. Merely instituting a gold standard will not bring stability. One must regulate heavily the degree that banks borrow short and lend long. We had many crises during the gold standard in the 19th century, none as bad as the Great Depression, but they all stemmed from a lack of bank regulation. I have no sympathy for the concept of “free banking.” Anyone that is making a large number of promises needs to be regulated; he is a systemic risk.

Gold coin as money, not the watered down gold backed money system need to be differentiated as a first point. Assuming a gold coin money, then banks with 100% reserves on the demand deposits are in no need of any regulation. Those that try and cheat, and move to less than 100% will be bankrupted as soon as any hint of impropriety is detected, through a bank run.

Might you have bank failures – sure. Will they be systemic, unlikely, but not impossible, if customers go to sleep and never require liquidity, it is possible over a long period of time the banks take chances, and move to fractional reserves, but this is highly unlikely for the following reason.

As soon as a fractional reserve loan is made, that loan appears as a demand deposit somewhere in the banking system. If it is another bank, then to maintain 100% reserves, that depositary bank will demand the delivery of the deposit from the loaning bank. It will not take long, for any bank inflating on the back of demand deposits to be caught out. It would take a little longer if gold is the commodity backing a paper money, but eventually the same mechanism will catch them out also.

So essentially, there is no need for regulation, which fails miserably anyway. The whole point of gold is that it is the free market’s money, and the free market easily regulates the money without any requirements for regulations etc. The current system is so bad because the government actively supports and encourages the banking system corruption. The government owns the money monopoly, from which they continually steal from all of us.

I haven’t seen the news yet, but, I’m guessing, somehow the Banks have thrown a spanner in the works, either that or Spain’s bank’s have, somewhere, it’s the banks.

Cullen has his latest post up, based on a stoush between Krugman and Keen. I’m guessing Steve Keen is pretty much on track, Krugman, as clueless as ever, and Cullen, well let’s look at Cullen’s contribution.

The recent crisis has been beneficial in at least one way – it has begun to shed light on some of the myths of our monetary system that have poisoned economics and politics for many decades. If I had to rank some of these myths I would almost certainly put the currency user vs. currency issuer myth at the top of the list.

I think just possibly he’s right on this point. While there are as many Keynesian’s as ever, and they have been joined by the MMT/MMR brigade, I also see far more Austrian economics, so possibly, something good will emerge.

But a close second is the myth of the money multiplier. Students are generally taught that our banking system works through some sort of “loanable funds” market or “money multiplier” whereby banks obtain deposits so they can then loan them out. There’s just one problem with these ideas – they’re not right.

The ‘money multiplier’ myth I agree is a myth in that it is a false theory, but it is no myth that such a theory actually exists: it is at the heart of Keynesian economics.

These ideas have all come to a head in recent weeks when Paul Krugman and Steve Keen got into a bit of a back and forth about the operational realities of the banking system.

The banking system, without doubt, creates more disinformation than any other in economics. Of course, the banking system walks hand-in-hand with the State, and almost by definition, becomes cloaked in lies and half-truths.

I won’t comment specifically on the ideas of either men, both of whom are fantastic economists, but I think this conversation exposes the degree to which most people continue to misinterpret modern banking and requires some brief discussion.

Let’s pass on by then.

The standard banking model says that banks are reserve constrained and that the amount of loans a given bank can make is a multiple of its reserves. But the recent crisis has shot king sized holes in this myth. The Fed has substantially expanded the amount of reserves in the banking system, but lending has flat-lined:

The ‘standard banking model’ according to who?

True, many do get confused here. A bank, can make loans on a multiple of it’s total deposit base, and that includes both demand deposits & time deposits. The ‘reserve’ is the fraction that is held as a ‘reserve’ of any new deposits received as liabilities, from which the remainder can create new loans.

So bank “A” receives $100 dollars as a new demand deposit. The bank under a 10% reserve ratio reserves $10 and can make $90 in new loans. Let’s say another customer of bank “A” requests a $90 loan from bank “A”.

Bank “A” makes the loan. The borrower ‘deposits’ the new loan into bank “A”. Bank “A” can now reserve $9 from that new deposit, and create a new loan of $81 to another customer. As you can see, on a 10% reserve ratio, you can ‘multiply’ the money by approximately 10X.

This is fractional reserve lending. It is legal, because the State deems it so, and more critically supports this abortion via a Central Bank, that, can print fiat currency in any amount so that if the ponzi scheme starts to unravel, the Central bank can provide ‘liquidity’ to the stricken banks. It is called, a bank run.

Reserve balances are determined by the Federal Reserve who acts as the monopoly supplier of reserves to the banking system. Banks can never “get rid” of reserves in the aggregate. They can shuffle them among each other, but only the Fed can destroy or create reserves through open market operations. The Fed oversees the payments system and in doing so must act to ensure that banks can obtain reserves in order to settle payments and meet reserve requirements as needed.

You see Cullen is only telling ‘part’ of the story. If the banks create more credit than the Central bank deem appropriate, then they start to drain currency through the ‘selling’ of Treasury paper, thus removing ‘liquidity’ from the system. If the opposite, and they want to add ‘liquidity’ they purchase securities from the banks. This is termed “Open market operations”.

But the Federal Reserve is not the only player in ‘liquidity’, so are you and I. In a normally functioning system, demand deposits & time deposits become ‘fiduciary media’ which means that they function as money, but, are not money in that they can always be redeemed at ‘par value’. In a bank run, depositors convert demand & time deposits, fiduciary media into ‘currency’ money through demanding liquidity. The entire edifice of pyramided loans based upon deposits, collapses, and the Central bank, must bail out banks, or have the money system collapse. This is precisely what we saw in 2008.

Bank lending is not reserve constrained (in fact, many countries don’t even have reserve requirements at all). This means that banks do not need reserves before they make loans. Instead, banks make loans first and obtain reserves in the overnight market (from other banks) or from the Fed after the fact (if needed). New loans result in a newly created deposit in the banking system.

Which simply means that the ‘multiplier’ has no limit. Instead of stopping at 10X, in this system you can go to 100X, or 1000X. When the crash comes, the multiple determines just how bad it’s going to get.

Banks are capital constrained. Banks can always find reserves from the central bank so banks do not check reserve balances before making loans. Instead, they will check the creditworthiness of the borrower and their own capital position to ensure that the loan is consistent with the goal of their business – earning a profit on the spread between their assets and liabilities.

But when banks know that their downside risk is covered by the taxpayer, they throw all risk management out of the window and lend as much and to whomever: witness the sub-prime debacle.

Banks attract deposits because they want to maintain the cheapest liabilities possible in order to maximize this spread on assets and liabilities. Banks are, after all, in the business of making a profit!

Only if they generate their loans from a deposit base. If they fund from the money markets, as did Northern Rock, they leverage to whatever, and damn the torpedoes.

You don’t need to understand balance sheet recessions or liquidity traps to know what’s going on there. You just need to understand how banking works. Yes, it’s true that the balance sheet recession has been a truly unique period in American history.

Incorrect.

Exactly the same mistakes have been made in every US financial crisis, courtesy of the Federal Reserve, courtesy of government inflation, which is driven through their insatiable thirst to hang onto power, thus necessitating the buying of votes and catering to cartels.

When the demand for credit collapsed the Fed was nearly helpless in reviving the credit markets.

Only because the banks were so scared of another run on their liquidity, that they refused to create new credit, hence, government stepped in to create the credit expansion via fiscal policies.

Despite a $1.6 trillion reserve injection the lending markets just didn’t budge. This might have appeared like an anomaly to some, but to those who understood banking this made perfect sense. More reserves were never going to result in more loans.

Of course not, but the reserves were necessary to allay public demand to convert deposits, or fiduciary media into currency.

This was not because it had temporarily become true, but because this is the way banking works. Not just inside a balance sheet recession or liquidity trap or whatever you want to call it, but always….

Again, never quite sure whether Cullen simply has no clue, or purposefully misleads his blog audience with half-truths, outright fabrications, etc.

Fed officials are prepared to hold the March policy meeting tomorrow. Don’t expect any fireworks, according to economists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

No major policy changes are expected at tomorrow’s meeting, although discussions about the U.S. economy should offer clues on what the Fed is prepared to do next.

Which is why the market was such a snooze-fest today. Mind-numbingly boring.

The answer lies here:

A bald-headed bearded stranger stopped in town and went into an small old hotel to check in. He asked to go check out the rooms first so, in good faith, he left a $100 bill—a deposit of sorts—with the hotel owner.

The stranger left a ‘deposit’. The deposit remained the property of the bald-man. Ownership was not transferred. It is analogous to a ‘demand deposit’ placed in a bank. Simply all that happened was ‘theft’. That he got the deposit back was simply a function of luck. His $100 was placed at risk: any one of the other debtors may have defaulted on their debts, and held onto the $100.

This is exactly what ‘fractional reserve lending’ actually does: it commits theft. The demand deposit is used as the reserve to pyramid new money loans into the economy, with the effect that should a major default occur [sub-prime mortgages] that the entire system [reserve deposits] are placed at risk + the outstanding creditors who cannot be paid as the $100 bill stops circulating.

A pretty serious bankruptcy. The ‘firm’ was large. Corzine, you would have thought, after his ‘experiences’ watching and losing money in Long Term Capital Management’ in 1998 would have seen the similarities. LTCM placed massive leveraged bets on the Russian rouble just before Russia defaulted…sovereigns never default right?

Reaching for yield (and prospectively capital appreciation) while shortening duration had become the new ‘smart money’ trade as we saw HY credit curves steepen earlier in the year (only to become the pain-trade very quickly). The attraction of those incredible yields on short-dated sovereigns was an obvious place for momentum monkeys to chase and it seems that was the undoing of MF Global. The Dec 2012 Italian bonds (of which MF held 91% of its ITA exposure in), as highlighted in today’s Bloomberg Chart-of-the-day, appears to be the capital-sucking instrument of doom for the now-stricken MF.

However, that happened to a bunch of people today with the bankruptcy of MF Global ($MF). Traders couldn’t access their accounts and the trading MF did was liquidation only, meaning closing positions. I feel bad for the employees of MF Global. They didn’t have a hand in running the company into the ground.

This dislocation is only a short term operational problem. Money in clearing firms is segregated away from the assets of the firm itself. Traders don’t worry about that. But when assets get frozen up and you need to post margin on positions it’s a royal pain in the you know what.

The market decline today wasn’t about MF Global. It was about continued worry in Europe. The Europeans papered over their problems by throwing more money at it. Do you really think the Italians can continue to auction of debt at 6% interest rates and pay for it? Not a chance. The broader market isn’t affected by one futures firm. The only reason it’s a big story is they are led by a former Goldman CEO, and former government official (Senator, Governor) that was rumored to become a Treasury secretary.

MF Global went bankrupt for the same reason a lot of clearing firms go under. They chase yield. All the guys like me that have excess money in their account after their positions are margined give firms a chance at some cash flow. The firms that go bankrupt use that money to buy overnight treasuries and earn some interest on it. The problem today, no one is paying any overnight interest so that cash flow stinks.

When you are an operation like MF Global, you might do some financial budgeting based on earning a certain return on assets. When you don’t earn that return, you need to bump up the risk you take to earn more yield. In MF’s case, instead of buying US Treasuries, they decided to buy European securities. What could go wrong?

A haircut that’s what.

Boom went their balance sheet. Now they are done. Refco and MF Global followed a similar strategy. They rolled up IB’s and then tried to sell a lot of value add products and generate cash flow from deposits and commissions. In Refco’s case, fraud brought them down. MF just made some really poor business decisions.

Those of us in the know in the futures industry never thought MF was a particularly clean house anyway. My friend Dan Dicker from New York can tell you chapter and verse about their reputation on the NYMEX/COMEX floor. It wasn’t very good.

I mean, what did you expect? Their CEO ran the state of New Jersey into the ground. His claim to fame was front running customer business at Goldman before he became a US Senator. All you have to do is read “When Genius Failed”. Goldman downloaded the positions of LTCM before they lent them the money, then pressed the positions and caused them to go bankrupt. They took the other side as they blew out and made a ton of dough. Karma sucks. What did Corzine run better? MF or NJ?

When is a default not a default?

Investors struggled with that question Thursday after European officials outlined plans that would see owners of Greek bonds take a 50 per cent loss on the face value of their holdings.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, an industry group that oversees the CDS market, says the Greek deal probably won’t trigger default clauses in CDS contracts because the 50 per cent “haircut” is voluntary.

That view is starting to roil the $25-trillion market for credit default swaps because it calls into question the fundamental reason for purchasing insurance against losses on bonds. If investors can no longer count on being able to hedge against the possibility of a loss, they may start demanding higher yields as compensation for increased risk.

“I would think [such a ruling by the ISDA] would be quite a negative for the market,” said Lawrence Chin, director of research at the Cundill division of Mackenzie Financial. “You could get hit on the debt, but you don’t get the insurance [payout].

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